Harden default Docker Compose security

docker-compose.bwrap.yml

@@ -0,0 +1,16 @@
+x-bwrap-security: &bwrap-security
+  cap_add:
+    - SYS_ADMIN
+  security_opt:
+    - apparmor=unconfined
+    - seccomp=unconfined
+
+services:
+  nanobot-gateway:
+    <<: *bwrap-security
+
+  nanobot-api:
+    <<: *bwrap-security
+
+  nanobot-cli:
+    <<: *bwrap-security

docker-compose.yml

@@ -6,11 +6,6 @@ x-common-config: &common-config
     - ~/.nanobot:/home/nanobot/.nanobot
   cap_drop:
     - ALL
-  cap_add:
-    - SYS_ADMIN
-  security_opt:
-    - apparmor=unconfined
-    - seccomp=unconfined
 
 services:
   nanobot-gateway:

docs/configuration.md

@@ -1919,7 +1919,7 @@ For API keys, tokens, and other secrets, see [Environment Variables for Secrets]
 | `tools.ssrfWhitelist` | `[]` | CIDR ranges exempted from the shared SSRF guard used by web fetches and HTTP/SSE MCP connections. Prefer exact host CIDRs such as `192.168.1.50/32`; broad ranges increase SSRF exposure. |
 | `channels.*.allowFrom` | omitted | Access control per channel. Omit to use pairing-only mode; set `["*"]` to allow everyone; or list specific user IDs. See [Pairing](#pairing) for details. |
 
-**Docker security**: The official Docker image runs as a non-root user (`nanobot`, UID 1000) with bubblewrap pre-installed. When using `docker-compose.yml`, the container drops all Linux capabilities except `SYS_ADMIN` (required for bwrap's namespace isolation).
+**Docker security**: The official Docker image runs as a non-root user (`nanobot`, UID 1000) with bubblewrap pre-installed. The default `docker-compose.yml` drops all Linux capabilities and keeps Docker's default AppArmor/seccomp profiles enabled. If you enable `"tools.exec.sandbox": "bwrap"` inside Docker, start Compose with `docker-compose.bwrap.yml` as an additional override so bubblewrap can create nested namespaces.
 
 
 ## Pairing

docs/deployment.md

@@ -74,6 +74,20 @@ docker compose logs -f nanobot-gateway                   # view logs
 docker compose down                                      # stop
 ```
 
+The default Compose file drops all Linux capabilities and keeps Docker's default
+AppArmor/seccomp profiles enabled. If you explicitly set
+`"tools.exec.sandbox": "bwrap"` in `~/.nanobot/config.json`, add the bwrap
+override file when starting containers:
+
+```bash
+docker compose -f docker-compose.yml -f docker-compose.bwrap.yml up -d nanobot-gateway
+docker compose -f docker-compose.yml -f docker-compose.bwrap.yml run --rm nanobot-cli agent -m "Hello!"
+```
+
+The override grants `CAP_SYS_ADMIN` and disables AppArmor/seccomp confinement for
+the container so bubblewrap can create its nested namespaces. Use it only when the
+bwrap sandbox is enabled.
+
 ### Docker
 
 ```bash
@@ -87,12 +101,17 @@ docker run -v ~/.nanobot:/home/nanobot/.nanobot --rm nanobot onboard
 vim ~/.nanobot/config.json
 
 # Run gateway (connects to enabled channels, e.g. Telegram/Discord/Mochat).
-# Mirrors the security caps and port mappings declared in docker-compose.yml:
-#   - `--cap-drop ALL --cap-add SYS_ADMIN` + unconfined apparmor/seccomp are required
-#     when `tools.exec.sandbox: "bwrap"` is enabled (bwrap needs CAP_SYS_ADMIN for
-#     user namespaces). Without them, `bwrap` exits with `clone3: Operation not permitted`.
-#   - `-p 8765:8765` exposes the WebSocket channel / WebUI alongside the gateway health
-#     endpoint on 18790.
+# `-p 8765:8765` exposes the WebSocket channel / WebUI alongside the gateway
+# health endpoint on 18790.
+docker run \
+  --cap-drop ALL \
+  -v ~/.nanobot:/home/nanobot/.nanobot \
+  -p 18790:18790 -p 8765:8765 \
+  nanobot gateway
+
+# If `tools.exec.sandbox: "bwrap"` is enabled, run with the extra permissions
+# bubblewrap needs for nested namespaces. Without them, `bwrap` may exit with
+# `clone3: Operation not permitted`.
 docker run \
   --cap-drop ALL --cap-add SYS_ADMIN \
   --security-opt apparmor=unconfined \