michaelxerandXubin Ren
bbca32fea9
Guard against shell-chain bypass where an attacker appends '&& malicious' after an allowlisted prefix. The allowlist check now splits the command on top-level chaining operators (&&, ||, ;, |) and requires every segment to match at least one allowPattern independently. Fixes #4521
112 lines
3.8 KiB
Python
112 lines
3.8 KiB
Python
"""Tests for allow_patterns priority over deny_patterns."""
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from __future__ import annotations
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from nanobot.agent.tools.shell import ExecTool
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def test_deny_patterns_block_rm_rf():
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"""Baseline: rm -rf is blocked by default deny list."""
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tool = ExecTool()
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result = tool._guard_command("rm -rf /tmp/build", "/tmp")
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assert result is not None
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assert "deny pattern filter" in result.lower()
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def test_allow_patterns_bypass_deny():
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"""allow_patterns take priority: matching command skips deny check."""
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tool = ExecTool(allow_patterns=[r"rm\s+-rf\s+/tmp/.*"])
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result = tool._guard_command("rm -rf /tmp/build", "/tmp")
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assert result is None
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def test_allow_patterns_must_match_to_bypass():
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"""Non-matching allow_patterns do NOT bypass deny."""
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tool = ExecTool(allow_patterns=[r"rm\s+-rf\s+/opt/"])
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result = tool._guard_command("rm -rf /tmp/build", "/tmp")
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assert result is not None
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assert "deny pattern filter" in result.lower()
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def test_extra_deny_patterns_from_config():
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"""User-supplied deny patterns are appended to built-in list."""
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tool = ExecTool(deny_patterns=[r"\bping\b"])
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# ping is blocked by extra deny
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assert tool._guard_command("ping example.com", "/tmp") is not None
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# rm -rf still blocked by built-in deny
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assert tool._guard_command("rm -rf /tmp/x", "/tmp") is not None
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def test_allow_patterns_bypass_extra_deny():
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"""allow_patterns also bypasses user-supplied deny patterns."""
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tool = ExecTool(
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deny_patterns=[r"\bping\b"],
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allow_patterns=[r"\bping\s+example\.com\b"],
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)
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result = tool._guard_command("ping example.com", "/tmp")
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assert result is None
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def test_allow_patterns_is_whitelist_only():
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"""When allow_patterns is set, non-matching non-denied commands are blocked."""
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tool = ExecTool(allow_patterns=[r"echo\s+hello"])
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# echo matches allow → ok
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assert tool._guard_command("echo hello", "/tmp") is None
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# ls does not match allow and is not in deny → blocked by allowlist
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result = tool._guard_command("ls /tmp", "/tmp")
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assert result is not None
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assert "allowlist" in result.lower()
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def test_guard_allow_patterns_block_non_matching_chained_segment():
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"""Every top-level shell segment must match an allow pattern."""
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tool = ExecTool(allow_patterns=[r"\becho\s+allowlisted\b"])
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result = tool._guard_command("echo allowlisted && touch /tmp/evil", "/tmp")
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assert result is not None
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assert "allowlist" in result.lower()
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def test_deny_patterns_search_original_command_with_quoted_hash():
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"""Deny checks must still inspect text after a quoted hash."""
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tool = ExecTool(deny_patterns=[r"\brm\s+-rf\s+/"])
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result = tool._guard_command('echo "#"; rm -rf /', "/tmp")
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assert result is not None
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assert "deny pattern filter" in result.lower()
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def test_allow_patterns_fullmatch_allows_exact_command():
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"""A full-command allow pattern can still exempt an exact denied command."""
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tool = ExecTool(allow_patterns=[r"rm\s+-rf\s+/tmp/build"])
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result = tool._guard_command("rm -rf /tmp/build", "/tmp")
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assert result is None
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def test_guard_allow_patterns_allow_single_matching_segment():
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tool = ExecTool(allow_patterns=[r"\becho\s+allowlisted\b"])
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result = tool._guard_command("echo allowlisted", "/tmp")
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assert result is None
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def test_guard_allow_patterns_allow_multiple_matching_segments():
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tool = ExecTool(
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allow_patterns=[
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r"\becho\s+allowlisted\b",
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r"\becho\s+also_allowed\b",
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]
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)
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result = tool._guard_command("echo allowlisted && echo also_allowed", "/tmp")
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assert result is None
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def test_guard_allow_patterns_keep_fullmatch_style_compatibility():
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tool = ExecTool(allow_patterns=[r"^echo\s+allowlisted$"])
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result = tool._guard_command("echo allowlisted", "/tmp")
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assert result is None
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