* test(agent): use python3 in ExecTool workspace scope tests (fixes#5062)
* test(agent): use python on Windows and python3 on POSIX in ExecTool workspace scope tests (fixes#5062)
* test(agent): share Python command fixture
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Co-authored-by: chengyongru <chengyongru.ai@gmail.com>
Add _QWEN_THINKING_MODELS to _MODEL_THINKING_STYLES with enable_thinking style. Prevents Qwen 3.5/3.6/3.7 models from exposing raw reasoning content in chat responses. Closes#4934
Symptom
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LLM requests intermittently fail with:
'utf-8' codec can't encode characters in position N-N+1: surrogates not allowed
when messages contain emoji-heavy content (e.g. HTML with mixed emoji + JSON round-trips).
This blocks the affected session until the session file is quarantined.
Root cause
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Surrogate sanitization was only applied at the CLI entry point
(nanobot/cli/commands.py: _sanitize_surrogates). Requests entering
the LLM provider layer through other channels (Feishu, cron, webui,
tool results, memory injection) had no defensive cleaning, so any
message that happened to carry unpaired UTF-16 surrogates (from an
upstream JSON round-trip with ensure_ascii=True on ill-formed input,
memory rehydration, or third-party content) would blow up at
json.dumps -> HTTP encode time inside the provider client.
Fix
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1. Extract sanitize_surrogates() and sanitize_surrogates_deep() into
nanobot/utils/helpers.py as the single source of truth. Both use
utf-16-le round-tripping with errors='surrogatepass' / 'replace',
so paired surrogates reconstruct back into their real code point
and lone surrogates collapse to U+FFFD.
2. Make nanobot/cli/commands.py:_sanitize_surrogates a thin wrapper
that re-exports the shared helper (backward compatible).
3. Add defense-in-depth at the LLM provider boundary in
nanobot/providers/base.py:_sanitize_empty_content by running
sanitize_surrogates_deep over each message and its content blocks
right before requests are serialized to JSON.
Non-goals
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- truncate_text() is intentionally left untouched. Python str slicing
cannot split a single code point into surrogate halves, so it is
not the source of lone surrogates.
- session/manager storage layer is untouched. Archived sessions
reproduced the failure only through the request path, not through
storage.
Verification
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- New regression suite tests/providers/test_sanitize_surrogates.py
covers: paired surrogate reconstruction, lone surrogate replacement,
identity return on clean input (zero allocation), deep recursion on
dict/list/tuple, provider _sanitize_empty_content integration, and
full utf-8 encodability of the sanitized request body.
- 14/14 new tests pass; full existing test module also green.
- Replayed 58 archived real session messages plus adversarial
lone-surrogate injection through the provider path with no encode
errors after the fix.
Impact
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- No behaviour change for clean inputs (sanitize_surrogates_deep is
an identity return when no surrogate is present).
- Fails-safe: unpaired surrogates degrade to U+FFFD instead of
aborting the entire request.
jobs.json can store everyMs/atMs and next/last run timestamps as strings.
Loading left them as str, so _compute_next_run compared str to int and raised TypeError.
Coerce with an optional-int helper at from_store_dict, matching runHistory int() paths.
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