fix(agent): soften SSRF guard recovery

Keep private URL access blocked at the tool boundary, but return a clear non-retryable hint so the agent can recover conversationally instead of aborting the turn.

Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com>
This commit is contained in:
Xubin Ren
2026-05-06 00:43:00 +08:00
committed by Xubin Ren
co-authored by Cursor
parent d97e177981
commit db14685a69
3 changed files with 61 additions and 34 deletions
+28 -15
View File
@@ -776,8 +776,6 @@ class AgentRunner:
handled = self._classify_violation(
raw_text=prep_error,
soft_payload=prep_error + hint,
ssrf_payload=prep_error,
ssrf_error=RuntimeError(prep_error),
event=event,
tool_call=tool_call,
workspace_violation_counts=workspace_violation_counts,
@@ -808,8 +806,6 @@ class AgentRunner:
raw_text=str(exc),
# Preserve legacy exception payloads without the retry hint.
soft_payload=payload,
ssrf_payload=payload,
ssrf_error=exc,
event=event,
tool_call=tool_call,
workspace_violation_counts=workspace_violation_counts,
@@ -829,8 +825,6 @@ class AgentRunner:
handled = self._classify_violation(
raw_text=result,
soft_payload=result + hint,
ssrf_payload=result,
ssrf_error=RuntimeError(result),
event=event,
tool_call=tool_call,
workspace_violation_counts=workspace_violation_counts,
@@ -849,8 +843,21 @@ class AgentRunner:
detail = detail[:120] + "..."
return result, {"name": tool_call.name, "status": "ok", "detail": detail}, None
# SSRF remains fatal; workspace path boundaries are soft + throttled.
_SSRF_MARKER: str = "internal/private url detected"
# SSRF is a hard security block at the tool boundary, but the agent turn
# should recover conversationally instead of aborting the runtime.
_SSRF_MARKERS: tuple[str, ...] = (
"internal/private url detected",
"private/internal address",
"private address",
)
_SSRF_BOUNDARY_NOTE: str = (
"This is a non-bypassable security boundary. Stop trying to access "
"private/internal URLs. Do not retry with curl, wget, encoded IPs, "
"alternate DNS, redirects, proxies, or another tool. Ask the user for "
"local files, logs, screenshots, or an explicit safe public URL instead. "
"If the user explicitly trusts this private URL, ask them to whitelist "
"the exact IP/CIDR via tools.ssrfWhitelist."
)
# Non-SSRF boundary markers returned to the LLM as recoverable tool errors.
_WORKSPACE_VIOLATION_MARKERS: tuple[str, ...] = (
@@ -864,7 +871,10 @@ class AgentRunner:
@classmethod
def _is_ssrf_violation(cls, text: str) -> bool:
return bool(text) and cls._SSRF_MARKER in text.lower()
if not text:
return False
lowered = text.lower()
return any(marker in lowered for marker in cls._SSRF_MARKERS)
@classmethod
def _is_workspace_violation(cls, text: str) -> bool:
@@ -872,7 +882,7 @@ class AgentRunner:
if not text:
return False
lowered = text.lower()
if cls._SSRF_MARKER in lowered:
if cls._is_ssrf_violation(lowered):
return True
return any(marker in lowered for marker in cls._WORKSPACE_VIOLATION_MARKERS)
@@ -881,8 +891,6 @@ class AgentRunner:
*,
raw_text: str,
soft_payload: str,
ssrf_payload: str,
ssrf_error: BaseException,
event: dict[str, str],
tool_call: ToolCallRequest,
workspace_violation_counts: dict[str, int],
@@ -890,12 +898,12 @@ class AgentRunner:
"""Classify safety-boundary failures, or return ``None`` to pass through."""
if self._is_ssrf_violation(raw_text):
logger.warning(
"Tool {} blocked by SSRF guard; aborting turn: {}",
"Tool {} blocked by SSRF guard; returning non-retryable tool error: {}",
tool_call.name,
raw_text.replace("\n", " ").strip()[:200],
)
event["detail"] = self._event_detail("workspace_violation: ", raw_text)
return ssrf_payload, event, ssrf_error
event["detail"] = self._event_detail("ssrf_violation: ", raw_text)
return self._ssrf_soft_payload(raw_text), event, None
if self._is_workspace_violation(raw_text):
escalation = repeated_workspace_violation_error(
@@ -918,6 +926,11 @@ class AgentRunner:
return None
@classmethod
def _ssrf_soft_payload(cls, raw_text: str) -> str:
text = raw_text.strip() or "Error: request blocked by SSRF guard"
return f"{text}\n\n{cls._SSRF_BOUNDARY_NOTE}"
@staticmethod
def _event_detail(prefix: str, text: str, limit: int = 160) -> str:
return (prefix + text.replace("\n", " ").strip())[:limit]